

# East Timor and Indonesia


Co-operation with Japan. Although there was deep hatred of Japan after World War II, by the 1980s Japan had become an important investor in Australia.

## Relations with South-East Asia

Before the Whitlam era, Australian governments had mainly viewed the countries of South-East Asia as outlying barriers to the spread of Communism or as potential centres of danger to Australia's security. There had been little attempt to understand the different cultures and aspirations of the South-East Asian peoples. In 1967 the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed. Its members

were Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines. Both the Fraser and Hawke governments were concerned to build good relations with these countries and with other nations in the region. Various approaches were made with a view to Australia having some other kind of formal association with ASEAN. However, ASEAN rejected these approaches on the grounds that Australia was a wealthy, developed Western nation, whereas the ASEAN nations were in an earlier stage of development. The main concern of the ASEAN states was that Australia should not use protective tariffs to restrict the entry of their products into Australian markets. The problem for Australia was that, when-

Source 8.17



The Asia and Pacific region.

Source 8.18

Hawke's own inclination towards the US is clearly to be supportive. His first visit to Washington in June revealed him to be very sympathetic to American foreign and defence policy.

This was no doubt a factor in Reagan's telephone call. Under attack from other allies Reagan must have been hopeful and confident of getting a more favourable response from the Australian Prime Minister.

Hayden is cooler towards the US. He appears to be much less willing to accept US attitudes than Hawke and is determined to stake out a more independent foreign policy position.

It had become increasingly clear that with the Labor Party there was deep concern about the American action in Grenada and growing alarm at the Australian Government's failure to take a strong position.

The statement Hayden drafted for consideration by Cabinet was critical of the US but still carefully worded. It appeared to be an attempt by Hayden to respond to the pressure within the party without the risk of clashing with Hawke.

But in the Cabinet room it became quickly apparent that Hawke and Hayden had underestimated the strength of feeling among ministers about the Grenada invasion. Minister after minister spelt out their deep concern, even anger, at the US action.

The Minister for Industry and Commerce, Senator John Button, spoke strongly and urged a tough response. He was speaking for the Centre group in Cabinet. The Immigration Minister, Stewart West, the only member of the Left in Cabinet, agreed with him.

From Geoff Kitney, 'Labor's Grenada Showdown', in the *National Times*, 4-10 November 1983.

ever tariffs were cut, Australia's unemployment grew and its balance of payments worsened. Australian trade unions and manufacturers argued that it was unfair to be expected to compete against the lower costs and very low wages of the ASEAN countries. The result was ongoing tension between Australia and ASEAN over trade.

## Australia and the USA

From the announcement of Britain's East of Suez withdrawal in 1967, Australian governments had increasingly looked to the USA as Australia's most powerful ally and potential protector. This remained the position under Fraser and Hawke. Australia remained a member of the Commonwealth, the world body of former members of the British Empire, but followed US policies on most world issues. The Hawke Government, unlike Whitlam's, was as close to the USA as any non-Labor government had been. Some ALP members were appalled at how pro-American Hawke was.

When the USA invaded the tiny Caribbean island republic of Grenada in 1983, it took a week for the Hawke Government to make a statement against the invasion and even then the Australian statement was weak in contrast with the strong criticism made by the British Conservative Government. Australia's Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, said that Australia could not support the use of external force by the Reagan US administration to resolve an internal problem in Grenada. However, on 27 October, the day before Hayden's statement, Hawke told a press

conference that he understood US concerns and that the US action was not aggression. In this disagreement with Hawke, Hayden had the support of several ministers in the Labor government and, very probably, most ALP members.

Australia's close ties with the USA under the Hawke Government were demonstrated again in 1984 when the newly elected Labour government in New Zealand banned US nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ships from entering New Zealand ports. In retaliation, the USA ended its defence arrangements with New Zealand but this did not affect the Australian-US alliance. In 1986 a bilateral defence agreement formalised defence ties between the USA and Australia. Australia's relations with its American ally were, however, strained from the late 1980s when the USA subsidised its agricultural exporters, assisting them to undercut Australian exports in Australia's traditional export markets. The USA took little notice of Australian protests, yet Australia again supported the USA by taking part in the Gulf War in 1991.

## Questions

- 1 Look closely at Source 8.17.
  - a Locate the original members of ASEAN.
  - b Why were these nations economically and strategically important to Australia?
- 2 Read Source 8.18.
  - a According to this article, how did Hayden and Hawke differ in their attitudes to the USA?
  - b What was the reaction within the Labor Cabinet to the US invasion of Grenada?

## Case study: Australia, Indonesia and East Timor

### Australia's relations with Indonesia

As you saw in Chapter 6, the Chifley Labor Government supported Indonesia's quest for independence after World War II. From the end of the seventeenth century Indonesia had been colonised by the Dutch and was known as the Netherlands East Indies. The Dutch finally transferred sovereignty to the new United States of Indonesia in December 1949 and in the following year the Menzies Government established diplomatic relations with the new nation and sponsored Indonesian membership of the United Nations.

However, from the late 1950s, Australia's relations with the regime of Indonesia's first president, Soekarno, deteriorated as Soekarno appeared to the West to be pro-communist. In 1964 Indonesia attempted a small-scale invasion of Malaysian territory. The 'confrontation' policy was opposed by Australia, which from 1963 to 1965 sent troops to Borneo to stop Indonesian infiltrators. Soekarno's rule came to an end in 1967 when, following an alleged communist coup attempt, power was handed over to the Indonesian military leader, General Soeharto.

### Relations with the Soeharto regime

Under Soeharto, confrontation with Malaysia was ended, the Indonesian communists were suppressed—thousands were killed and many more imprisoned—and friendly relations were established with the capitalist powers. The military was given a strong role in government and the electoral system was fixed so that opposition groups could not gain power. Because Soeharto was an anti-communist, the West ignored the fact that he was also a dictator. Under Soeharto's rule, Indonesia became wealthier, but the wealth was concentrated in the hands of a few corrupt members of Soeharto's family and his friends. This system was labelled 'crony capitalism' by its critics.

From the time of the Soeharto coup all Australian governments maintained close relations with the Indonesian regime. This was seen as important for Australia's security. Indonesia is Australia's nearest Asian neighbour and is the largest country in South-East Asia. It is made up of 13 500 islands ranging from tiny atolls to large land masses. It is the fourth most heavily populated country in the world and is the largest of the Islamic countries. Over 80 per cent of its people are Muslims.

### The Indonesian invasion of East Timor

In April 1974 the dictatorial government of Portugal was overthrown in a revolution. The policy of the new Portuguese government was to decolonise—to grant Portugal's colonies their independence. The Portuguese colony of East Timor lay just a few hundred kilometres north of Darwin, sharing a land border with Indonesian West Timor. Three major political groups emerged in East Timor in May 1974, the pro-Indonesian UDT, the APODETI and the ASDT, which was renamed Fretilin (the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) in September.

In February 1975 Australian newspapers carried reports of an intelligence 'leak' about a planned Indonesian invasion of East Timor. On 11 August 1975 the UDT staged a military coup in Dili, the East Timorese capital. This resulted in a short civil war battle late in August in which Fretilin defeated the UDT troops, who retreated across the border into Indonesian West Timor. On 14 October

Indonesian troops attacked across the East Timorese border. Among those they killed were five Australian television journalists. Despite the Indonesian attack, Fretilin declared the independent Democratic Republic of East Timor on 28 November 1975, just seventeen days after the dismissal of the Whitlam Government in Australia.

However, on 7 December 1975 Indonesian forces attacked Dili. Australia responded the following day, when Andrew Peacock, Foreign Minister in the Fraser caretaker government, issued a statement condemning the Indonesian invasion. Despite this, the invasion and takeover continued and on 17 July 1976 Soeharto announced that East Timor had officially become part of Indonesia. During the invasion and in the following years, Fretilin waged a guerilla war to free the country. At least 100 000 Timorese died at the hands of the Indonesian forces in a land that had a population of only 700 000.

Since that time it has become clear that Whitlam and the Fraser Government acquiesced in the takeover and occupation of East Timor. Despite the fact that the United Nations continued to recognise Portugal as the only legitimate ruler of East Timor, Australia recognised Indonesia's right to rule. It is now clear that Whitlam was informed of Indonesia's intention to invade and raised no real objections despite strong sympathy for East Timor among many Labor members of parliament and supporters of the Whitlam Government. Many remembered that thousands of East Timorese had died supporting Australian soldiers against the Japanese during World War II. Between 1975 and 1983 the Fraser Government did nothing to protect the East Timorese.

When the Hawke Government came to power in 1983, it ignored ALP policy, which stated that East Timor had 'an inalienable right to self-determination and independence'. Instead the government appeared apologetic to Indonesia, which resented ALP policy on the issue and criticisms of Indonesian actions by Australian trade unions, churches and journalists. The government also provided defence aid and military training for the Indonesian army while that same army was maintaining an oppressive regime in East Timor.

### Source 8.19

The former prime minister Mr Gough Whitlam strongly supported East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia in two crucial meetings with Indonesia's then President Soeharto, secret diplomatic documents obtained by the *Herald* reveal.

The official record of the meetings, plus other classified Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade documents given to the *Herald*, will torpedo attempts by Whitlam loyalists this week to save his record on East Timor through the selective leak of one letter to Mr Soeharto.

In the letter, Mr Whitlam warns the President against taking unilateral military action in East Timor.

Although the records show Mr Whitlam always adding that the territory's future be decided by the freely expressed wish of the East Timorese, this was given second place, and in one key instance was mentioned as necessary 'for the domestic audience' in Australia.

He described relations with Jakarta as 'paramount'.

The opening of the historical records comes as the Labor Party is rent by the move by its foreign affairs spokesman, Mr Laurie Brereton, to break from policy set under Mr Whitlam, which excused a forcible annexation in which more than 100 000 East Timorese died.

Mr Whitlam met Mr Soeharto twice during the tense period between Portugal's decision in April 1974 to decolonise the territory and the August 1975 outbreak of civil war that led to its invasion and annexation.

At the first meeting, on September 6, 1974, in Yogyakarta, Mr Whitlam told Mr Soeharto that two things were basic to his own thinking on East Timor, the record says.

'First, he believed that East Timor should become part of Indonesia. Second, this should happen in accordance with the properly expressed wishes of the people of Portuguese Timor.'

East Timor was too small and economically unviable to stand alone and independence 'would be unwelcome to Indonesia, Australia and other countries in the region'.

The record added: 'The Prime Minister noted that, for the domestic audience in Australia, incorporation into Indonesia should appear to be a natural process arising from the wishes of the people.'

Hamish McDonald, in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 March 1999.

### Source 8.20

The 484 pages of diplomatic cables, policy papers and ministerial submissions show Jakarta confided in Australian diplomats from mid-1974 about its plans to take over East Timor. Australia was given three days' notice of the covert invasion of the territory in which five Australia-based reporters were killed ...


Mr Willesee last night told *The Age* that he still believed Australia connived with Jakarta. 'Of course Indonesia has a special place,' he said. 'But where did all that get us? Our overemphasis on Indonesia made it easier for them to invade and what was the end result? Twenty-five years on, the relationship is worse than ever and look at what happened in between. All that murder and calamity.'

Mr Willesee confirmed that he had lost out in the policy debate to Mr Whitlam. 'Gough was quite open with me. He said, "I will win", and he did, maybe unfortunately.'

The documents—released six years early by Foreign Minister Alexander Downer because of the 'exceptional public interest' in the issue—show how the extent of Australia's knowledge restricted its options to object when Indonesia invaded.

The *Age* Online, 13 September 2000.

### Source 8.21



From the *Sun Herald*, 30 December 2000.



**Source 8.22****Australia's chequered history of duplicity**

If Gough Whitlam's government enmeshed Australia in Indonesia's underhand campaign to take over East Timor, it was under Malcolm Fraser that Canberra deepened the complicity against a backdrop of atrocities and deliberate mass starvation on the ground.

After Mr Whitlam's dismissal on November 11, 1975, the Fraser administration continued the policies of withholding knowledge that would hurt Indonesian interests, and making token protests that were privately described as such to the Indonesians.

The recently published memoirs of senior Australian diplomat Mr Alf Parsons reveal that as early as mid-1976, when Mr Fraser and his foreign minister, Mr Andrew Peacock, visited Jakarta, they were promising *de jure* or legal recognition of Indonesian sovereignty as soon as Australian public opinion was judged acquiescent.

The same year, Canberra deliberately obstructed attempts by a UN special envoy, Mr Winspeare Guicciardi, to reach resistance-controlled areas in East Timor. It also seized radio transmitters used by supporters in the Northern Territory to contact the resistance, a flagrant suppression of an Australian freedom.

The *de jure* recognition was effectively granted in 1978 when Australia began negotiations with Indonesia on delineation of the Timor Gap maritime resources boundary.

Hamish McDonald, in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 9 September 1999.

**Source 8.23**

Sixty thousand people were killed in the first three months. Fretilin leaders retreated to the mountains to organise a guerrilla campaign, which still continues today.

Their isolation from the world is broken only by hand-carried documents and photographs smuggled out of the island. They describe ambushes of Indonesian positions, Indonesian manhunts to capture guerrilla leaders and barbaric torture of villagers suspected of sympathising with the guerrilla movement.

Amnesty International has interviewed hundreds of refugees who corroborate these claims.

From the *Sun Herald*, 28 November 1990.

**Source 8.24**

It was never a secret. If you were around at the time with your eyes and your brain open, you'll remember. If you weren't or didn't, then go back and look at the headlines. They weren't all about the political hysteria of sending the Whitlam Government to the stake. East Timor was big news, too.

In the end, though, for most of us, Kerr's coup was bigger than Soeharto's and the repercussions more immediately relevant. Even the deaths of those five newsmen far off in some unpronounceable place came and went at the time as a sidebar to the death of the Whitlam Government.

But what happened in Timor was never a secret.

So when Malcolm Fraser poked his head up the other day and suggested he might have been kept in the dark about what Indonesia had really been up to in East Timor in late 1975, and how complicit Australia had been by default, you had to wonder whose leg he was trying to pull.

Yet when ABC television's Tim Lester asked Fraser four days ago if he had been briefed, as caretaker PM after November 11, 1975, on Australia's warning by its diplomats in Jakarta of the coming Indonesian invasion, he replied: 'It's 25 years ago, and there's that caveat on it. But I very strongly believe I would have remembered such a material fact. I do not believe I was briefed. I believe it was a very serious omission.'

Q: 'Had you been properly briefed on that prior warning, might it ultimately have changed the Fraser Government's long-term policy on the question of Indonesia and East Timor's integration?'

Fraser: 'That's a real possibility.'

Politicians can be so shameless. At least Gough Whitlam, to date, hasn't tried to pretend, not that he might have forgotten but that he 'would have remembered'. Or twaddle that, 25 years in retrospect, it was a 'real possibility' that there 'might' have been a different government attitude if he had been 'properly briefed'.

Whitlam has remained silent. He has much to stay silent about, of course. But Fraser, too, could well have shut up. At least until he had refreshed that memory that might or might not be working, by reading this week's release of 800-plus pages of official Australian documents on the 1974-1976 period of the East Timor tragedy.

Alan Ramsey, in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 September 2000.

**Source 8.25**

Mr Hawke said on Friday the tragedy was unlikely to jeopardise his proposed visit next year.

He said Indonesian authorities and the people of East Timor, including resistance forces, should sit down and work out how East Timor could remain part of Indonesia in a manner acceptable to both.

From the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 November 1991.

**Source 8.26****Remember Timor's bravery**

As an ex-member of No. 4 Independent Company (part of Sparrow Force) who served in Timor during the latter part of 1942, I most urgently request that the Government reconsider its previous decision on East Timor.

Over the past two decades, it has been obvious that our governments have conveniently forgotten that during World War II the people of East Timor were not only our allies but also our protectors and saviours.

Conversely, during that period, the indigenous people of West Timor (now part of Indonesia) were distinctly hostile to our troops.

Ever since 1975, we, as a nation, have repeatedly 'kow-towed' to Indonesia, and late in 1989 the Government stabbed our old ally in the back when it ratified the Timor Gap Treaty with Indonesia.

Recently on a TV interview, in answer to a question as to why Mr Hawke had different standards on Kuwait and East Timor, his reply was that they were different situations—Kuwait was a member of the United Nations. Tears for one and to hell with the other!

I'm sure the average person considers both cases to be very similar.

It is requested that Mr Hawke immediately withdraw Australia's apparent acknowledgment of Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor and actively support Portugal's efforts in the UN to provide self-determination for the East Timorese people by requesting the UN set up and control the relevant referendum.

Letter to the Editor, *Telegraph Mirror*, 7 December 1991.

**Questions**

- Study Sources 8.19 and 8.20.
  - As there were clear indications that most East Timorese did not want to be part of Indonesia, what could Whitlam, at his meeting with Soeharto in September 1974, have meant by saying that he believed East Timor should become part of Indonesia and 'for the domestic audience in Australia, incorporation into Indonesia should appear to be ... arising from the wishes of the people'?
  - Don Willesee was Foreign Minister in the Whitlam Government. What did he mean by saying that Australia 'connived' with Indonesia in 1974?
  - Why do you think these diplomatic documents, which would normally have been kept secret for thirty years, were released six years early by the Australian Government?
- Read Sources 8.22 and 8.24.
  - What role did the Fraser Government play in acquiescing to Indonesia's invasion and occupation of East Timor?
  - Why do you think Fraser claimed in 2000 to have been 'kept in the dark' about events in East Timor?
- Look at Source 8.21. When Iraq invaded the oil-rich Kuwait in 1990, the Hawke Government immediately agreed to a US request for Australian support for a US attack on Iraqi forces. What point does this cartoon make about the difference between that response and Hawke's policy on East Timor?
- Source 8.23 describes the methods used by Indonesian forces in East Timor. Source 8.25 reports on Hawke's response following an Indonesian massacre of unarmed East Timorese demonstrators in 1991. Why do you think the Hawke Government, like the Fraser Government before it, was so willing to appease the Indonesian regime?
- Many Australians regarded the failure of their governments to help the East Timorese as a shameful betrayal. How does Source 8.26 help you to understand the reasons for this view?
- Using 8.19 to 8.26, answer the following questions:
  - What possible choices were available to Australia with regard to Indonesia and East Timor from 1975 to 1990?
  - How do you think Australian governments should have handled the issue?
  - How can you explain the choices made by Australian governments in this period?
  - Should morality determine foreign policy? How is morality determined?

**Source 9.30**

[Australian] foreign policy needs to be completely overhauled so that it no longer assumes that Australia's long-term interests are best served by bending over backwards to please a venal [corrupt], authoritarian elite in Jakarta [Indonesia's capital].

From now on policy should reflect a simple proposition—that a more democratic government in Jakarta offers the best chance of improving Australia's security and economic interests, as well as the welfare of the Indonesian people ... astonishingly, policy has been based squarely on the opposite premise for more than 30 years—that it is in Australia's interest to have a particularly nasty dictator wield power in Indonesia ...

While prime minister [Paul Keating] ... was quoted as regarding the dictator [Soeharto] as some kind of a 'father figure' ... Howard's statement after Soeharto's resignation ... lauded Soeharto for the 'enormous stability' and 'significant increase in living standards' he had brought to Indonesia. In fact, Soeharto has left the Indonesian economy in ruins ...

Only the previous Sunday, the Chief of the Australian Army ... described the Indonesian military as 'well led' ...

Brian Toohey in the *Sun Herald*, 24 May 1998.

region became volatile with civil war in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands and coups against democratic governments in Fiji in 1987 and 2000. In these conflicts Australia used its influence to exert pressure for democracy and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

### Australia, Indonesia and East Timor—a debt repaid?

Throughout most of the 1990s, Australian policies on Indonesia's occupation of East Timor followed the pattern that had been established in the 1970s and maintained throughout the 1980s. On 12 November 1991, the Indonesian army fired on a crowd of unarmed demonstrators in the East Timorese capital, Dili. Over a hundred people were killed in the shooting and many more were murdered when demonstrators were rounded up after the Dili massacre. Timorese refugees in Australia protested against the

massacre and the Indonesian occupation of their country by placing white crosses outside the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra and building a Liberation Centre outside the Embassy. It was later moved to the lawn in front of the Old Parliament House in Canberra.

### The collapse of the Soeharto regime

In 1997 the weakness of Indonesia's 'crony capitalist' economy was fully revealed when its currency collapsed. In the wake of widespread poverty and massive unemployment, demonstrating Indonesian students forced Soeharto's resignation in May 1998. Australia's longstanding support for Soeharto had been based on a wish to have good relations with Indonesia, but many Australians wondered if such support for a corrupt and now discredited regime might have done much to damage goodwill among the population of our nearest Asian neighbour.

The Indonesian caretaker government led by B. J. Habibie announced in February 1999 that the people of East Timor would be given a free vote for autonomy within Indonesia. If they rejected it, they could have independence. At first it appeared that the Howard Government would continue the policies followed by every Australian government since 1975, especially when it expressed approval for East Timorese autonomy rather than independence. However, events were soon to bring a dramatic change in Australian policy.


### Freedom amid terror

For months before the East Timor autonomy referendum, killings, torture and intimidation were carried out by pro-Indonesian militias armed and supported by Indonesian soldiers and police. Despite such terror, 78.5 per cent of East Timorese voted against autonomy and, therefore, for independence in the August ballot, which was largely supervised on behalf of the UN by unarmed Australian Federal Police.

Enraged by the result, the militias went on a murderous rampage. Hundreds of independence supporters were slaughtered, including several Roman Catholic nuns and priests. Nearly every building in the capital, Dili, was destroyed. Seventy per cent of the population had to flee for their lives, many attempting to reach the protection of the Falantil (previously called Fretilin) guerillas in the mountains. Some 250 000 people were forced by the



Source 9.31



Soeharto in more tranquil times ... in person with Paul Keating (left) and on billboards with John Howard (right). From the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 23 May 1998.

militias into camps across the border in Indonesian West Timor. The UN, under militia attack, withdrew to Darwin in September.

Throughout these events Australian and other world leaders pressured the Indonesian Government to protect the people. They kept up the diplomatic pretence that the violence was not condoned by Indonesia's rulers and military chiefs, but was supported only by 'rogue elements' in the TNI (Indonesian Army). Increasingly few people outside Indonesia believed this.

#### Rescued by INTERFET

Australian opinion was outraged and the Howard Government, supported by all mainstream Australian political parties, led the way in pressuring Indonesia to allow a UN peacekeeping force into East Timor. This force, called INTERFET, entered East Timor in September 1999. It was composed mainly of Australian troops and was led by Australia's Major-General Peter Cosgrove.

While INTERFET aroused hostility in Indonesia and was criticised by the government of Malaysia, it

won worldwide respect. With restraint and efficiency its men and women took up the role of protecting the Timorese people, disarming the militias and guarding the borders against militia raids. By March 2000, the Timorese were rebuilding their nation under a transitional UN administration.

#### The quest for justice and hope for the future

So destructive and cruel were the actions of pro-Indonesian militias that the UN Commission on Human Rights authorised a mission to Timor to investigate crimes against humanity. In September 2000, UN aid workers were forced to abandon their humanitarian work among refugees still held in West Timor camps when several aid workers were murdered by the militias who ran these camps and terrorised the people living in them. Following a world outcry, President Wahid's Government, the first democratically elected Indonesian government since 1949, at last ordered the disarming of militias in West Timor and promised that the people in the West Timor camps would be free to return home.

Source 9.32



Students at Jakarta's parliament building celebrating the resignation of Soeharto. From the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 22 May 1998.

However, in the following months, Wahid appeared to have limited control over much that occurred in Indonesia. His government appeared to be undermined by attempts involving sections of the TNI and pro-Soeharto forces to destabilise the country, and unable to find solutions to the demands of separatist movements and to deal with ethnic and religious violence on several islands.

Source 9.33



Armed men from the pro-Indonesian militia group 'Aitarak' (Thorn) run through the streets of Dili, April 12, 1999, as a show of force to indicate their readiness to crush separatists, who have been fighting for independence since 1975 (Associated Press).





East Timorese cheer the arrival of Australian troops at a refugee camp in Dare, East Timor on 21 September 1999.  
From the *Australian*, 22 September 1999.

## Questions

- 1 Study Source 9.28.
  - a What was the role of Australian troops in Cambodia in 1992?
  - b Why did Prime Minister Keating regard the commitment as a source of 'justifiable pride'?
  - c How was this different to the commitment of Australian troops to the Vietnam War almost thirty years earlier?
- 2 Explain the viewpoint of Source 9.29. What is this cartoon saying about Australia's changing relationship with the nations of Asia?
- 3 Study Sources 9.30, 9.31 and 9.32.
  - a What, according to Source 9.30, had been wrong with Australia's relationship with Indonesia during the Soeharto regime?
  - b How could Sources 9.31 and 9.32 be used as evidence to support this argument?
- 4 Study Sources 9.33 and 9.34.
  - a Why do you think the decision to send Australian troops to East Timor was overwhelmingly popular in Australia?
  - b Explain how this decision represented a significant change in Australian foreign policy.

